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Role of Information and Communication on Spatial Conservation Auction  
Performance: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment 
 
Policy makers such as the USDA are interested in 
producers voluntarily adopting pro-environmental 
land use practices on their properties as these land 
uses deliver various ecosystem service benefits. As a 
result, they have implemented incentive based poli-
cies such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
(Hellerstein et al., 2015). The CRP involves a reverse 
auction in which producers submit bids for adopting 
different land use practices. In running these auctions, 
agencies are interested in both cost-effectiveness i.e. 
procuring land use projects which yield the highest 
level of ecosystem service benefits for the money 
spent and specific environmental goals. One key goal 
is project procurement involving the same land use 
implemented on neighboring properties/parcels or 
those within some distance of each other. Such spatial 
contiguity is important as coordinated land manage-
ment can magnify the production of different ecosys-
tem service benefits such as water pollution reduction, 
lower habitat fragmentation and enhanced biodiversi-
ty conservation, and increased pollination services to 
name a few.  
In this study, we focus on the impact of two features 
on the performance of a spatial conservation auction 
i.e. an auction that explicitly targets spatial contiguity. 
The first feature is the amount of information re-
vealed to bidders and the second is the possibility for 
auction participants to communicate with each other. 
We are interested in the first feature since procure-
ment auctions in general, and conservation auctions 
in particular, can be quite complex for bidders, as the 
items being procured are often evaluated based on 
multiple characteristics in addition to their price, in-
cluding quality, quantity, delivery time, etc. In these 
settings, providing information can facilitate bidding. 
Yet, more information can also lead to higher rent 
premiums, an issue especially relevant for conserva- 
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  7-6-18 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  117.56  *  111.00 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  171.62  183.76  * 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  173.38  158.13  * 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  221.09  226.95  209.65 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  87.77  78.89  76.84 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  103.98  78.07  84.69 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  185.44  162.85  162.89 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  425.01  379.29  377.52 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4.57  4.78  4.56 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.63  3.49  3.36 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  9.47  8.79  7.83 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6.20  5.40  5.18 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.78  2.90  2.87 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  147.50  170.00  * 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75.00  100.00  107.50 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  *  102.50  100.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  103.50  144.00  106.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42.00  40.50  37.10 
 ⃰ No Market          
tion auction policies given the extensive rent seeking that 
has been documented in the CRP auctions over multiple 
signups (Ulber et al., 2011). Next, our interest in studying 
the impact of communication stems from the fact that 
communication is a reality on agricultural landscapes. 
Moreover, for a spatial auction communication can be ben-
eficial as it can coordinate bid submissions by neighbors 
especially if there are multiple land uses to choose from 
(which usually is the case for conservation auctions). Yet, 
communication can also lead to collusive bidding, low auc-
tion competitiveness and hence low cost-effectiveness, 
none of which are desirable outcomes.  
Given this context, we conducted a laboratory economic 
experiment with university students to evaluate spatial con-
servation auction performance given communication and 
different information revelation strategies. For this purpose 
we focus on a multi-round auction in which bidders submit 
bids through multiple iterations or rounds before a final set 
of winners are determined. The results of our study provide 
some benchmark findings which can inform field experi-
mental trials on spatial conservation auctions involving 
actual producers.  
Experimental Design 
Since we are interested in spatial coordination, in the ex-
periment, twelve subjects are located on a circular geo-
graphical landscape on which each person has a left and a 
right neighbor. Subjects earn money depending upon 
whether they are selected as winners in the auction or not 
as well as whether their neighbors have been selected at the 
end of multiple bidding rounds. Each subject is endowed 
with three land use projects or items marked as Red, Green 
and Blue items. During the auction subjects select and sub-
mit a bid for one of these items. Terms such as conserva-
tion, ecosystem services and land use projects are not men-
tioned in the auction as these can impact subject behaviors 
in the lab which in turn would make isolation of the treat-
ment effect (if any) challenging – i.e. it would be difficult to 
conclude whether subjects are responding to the treatment 
manipulation or to the environmental framing.  
 
 
 
Communication Treatment 
Information Treatment 
Without Benefit In-
formation 
With Absolute Value 
Benefit Information 
With Rank Value Benefit 
Information 
Without Communication 
NO-COMM-NO-
INFO 
(5 sessions) 
NO-COMM-VALUE 
(5 sessions) 
NO-COMM-RANK 
(5 sessions) 
With Communication  COMM-NO-INFO (5 sessions) 
COMM-VALUE 
(5 sessions) 
COMM-RANK 
(5 sessions) 
We implement three information treatments using a 
between subject format: NO-INFO, in which partici-
pants are not shown the magnitude of the environ-
mental quality value of the three available items, VAL-
UE in which subjects receive absolute environmental 
benefits information and RANK, in which only the 
relative ranking of the three items is revealed. The 
communication treatments are also implemented in a 
between subject format – NO-COMM in which sub-
jects cannot communicate with each other and 
COMM in which a players communicates with their 
two neighbors in every round prior to bid submission. 
Thus, we obtain 6 different experimental treatments as 
presented in Table 1.  
Table 1: Experimental Design 
We conducted five experimental sessions, each with 12 
participants recruited from undergraduate student popu-
lation at University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Participants 
earned a $9 show-up fee and money made during the ex-
periment. Earnings were recorded in Experimental Cur-
rency Units (ECUs) and the experiment was conducted in 
Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Within a session, subjects 
participated in nine multi-round periods, with a mini-
mum of four and a maximum of seven rounds per period. 
Participants were not informed about the fixed budget of 
4,500 ECUs that was used to procure projects and pay 
winners in each auction period. This figure remained 
constant across all treatments.  
Each session included the four components: a paid risk 
preference elicitation exercise (Holt and Laury 2002), an 
unpaid practice auction to familiarize participants with 
the user interface, nine paying periods and a demograph-
ic survey. Before beginning the experiment, a presenta-
tion was made to the subjects about the different experi-
mental features. Handouts were also provided to which 
subjects could refer during the experiment. In the 
COMM treatments, at the beginning of each auction 
round, subjects had the opportunity to message their  
neighbors for a duration of 30 seconds through two chat 
boxes displayed on their screen. Once 30 seconds were over, 
the chat content was displayed for an additional 10 seconds 
after which subjects proceeded to the item selection phase 
of the auction period. Instructions barred subjects from 
revealing their identity to neighbors and asked them to be 
civil to one another. All features of the auction could be dis-
cussed through the communication channels. 
We used three different sets of cost and quality values to 
determine the cost and quality endowments for each subject 
in a period. Each set was used in three auction periods thus 
minimizing the influence of any possible scale effects. The 
values were randomly drawn from two uniform distribu-
tions –cost ~[0, 1000] and quality ~ [0, 100].. They were cho-
sen such that in the absence of asymmetric information, the 
auctioneer would choose 6 out of 12 projects in all periods, 
involve the selection of multiple items of the same color and 
represent different spatial configurations. Figure 1 indicates 
the spatial configurations of the winning projects. The All 
Blue pattern is the Single Large reserve pattern with 5 
shared borders between the selected projects, the All Green 
is the Several Small reserve pattern with a total of 4 shared 
borders and last, the All Red is the Asymmetric reserve pat-
tern with 4 shared borders as well. The Single Large pattern 
was assigned to Periods 1, 4 and 7; Several Small to 2, 5 and 
8; and Asymmetric to 3, 6 and 9. The parameters were as-
signed to subjects such that (i) even if neighbors exchanged 
cost and quality endowment information via chatting, sub-
jects did not know that the endowments from the past peri-
ods were being repeated, (ii) never faced the same endow-
ment in multiple periods, and (iii) if everyone bid at cost, 
then across all 9 periods, 6 people would win 4 times and 
the other 6 would win 5 times.  
After all bids had been submitted in a round, combinations 
of bids were evaluated and were given a score equal to the 
sum of quality of the submitted items divided by the sum of 
bids. When calculating the total benefit, twice the value of 
an environmental premium (= 25) (once for each adjacent 
project if any) was added. Similarly, twice the value of the 
bonus (= 50 ECU) was added to the total sum of bids. The 
scores were then ranked in descending order and 
combinations of projects were provisionally accepted 
based on the scores until the budget was exhausted.  
At this stage, a Results Screen was displayed on which 
subjects received feedback about auction outcomes. 
This included information about (i) whether their 
item had been selected, (ii) whether neighbors items 
had been selected and if yes, which colored item, (iii) 
their provisional earnings for the round or their actual 
earnings if they were winners in the period and (iv) 
the total bonus earned. For easy reference the cost and 
quality value (in VALUE-NO-COMM and VALUE-
COMM sessions) of the submitted item was also pro-
vided. Finally, this screen included a History Table 
that recorded the above values for all rounds of a peri-
od and all auction periods. Subjects were informed 
whether or not their offer had been provisionally ac-
cepted at the end of the round and then could adjust 
their offers in response to the information about the 
provisional status of their offer from the previous 
round. However, submitted 
offers could only be re-
duced in subsequent rounds 
of the period. At the con-
clusion of each period, par-
ticipants were informed 
about whether or not their 
offer had been accepted and 
winners' earnings were up-
dated on the basis of the 
difference between their 
winning item's offer and its 
corresponding cost and bonus paid if one or both 
neighbors same colored item was also part of the win-
ning allocation.  
Metrics of Analysis:  
In order to analyze auction performance, we consider 
the Percentage of Optimal Cost-Effectiveness Ratio 
(POCER) measured as the degree of cost-effectiveness 
of the conservation auction. POCER is defined as 
Figure 1: First-Best Spatial Configurations in 9 Auction Periods.  
X*
i = 1 if ith subject is winner in the first-best allocation, 
O otherwise 
xi = 1 if ith subject is a winner, 0 otherwise 
	First, consider the numerator of POCER. In the nu-
merator of the fraction,Ʃi	qi	xi	represents the sum of 
environmental benefits of all items accepted by the  
auctioneer from set of winning bidders i and p Ʃi xi the sum 
of total environmental premiums. In the denominator of 
the fraction, Ʃ oi xi represents the sum of selected bids from 
the set of winning bidders i and b Ʃi(xj + xk) xi the total bo-
nuses paid for every shared border between a adjacent se-
lected items of the same color. This amount represents the 
total expenditure of the auction. In a similar fashion the 
fraction in the denominator represents the total environ-
mental benefits and expenses in the auction when the first 
best allocation is selected with bids submitted equal to costs 
so that there are no information rents.  
Results:  
Figure 2 presents a histogram of the number of shared bor-
ders between neighboring projects of the same color under 
the different treatments for each of the three spatial config-
urations. It is evident that the bonus payments are success-
ful in procuring identical items representing the same land 
use projects from neighbors.  
Figure 3 represents the average POCER values by treatment 
and spatial configuration and indicates that average cost-
effectiveness is lower when subjects have to coordinate to 
create a large core than if they have to create two identical 
small reserves or two small but different sized reserves. This 
outcome is not surprising since creation of a large core re-
quires coordinated effort of six players while the other con-
figurations can be created by fewer people coordinating.  
Since performance depends upon coordination, aver-
age performance is lower for all treatments when cre-
ating a large core relative to the other patterns. Moreo-
ver, for both Single Large and Asymmetric patterns, 
performance is the lowest in both the NO-INFO treat-
ments compared to the VALUE and RANK infor-
mation treatments for both communication condi-
tions. 
For a systematic analysis of these findings, we present 
the results of random effects regression model in Table 
2 with POCER obtained in the final round of every 
period for each session as the dependent variable. The 
independent variables include dummy variables for 
the VALUE, RANK and COMM treatments, a Period 
variable capturing the effect of subject experience in 
the auction on performance, dummy variables for the 
two spatial configurations – Several Small and Asym-
metric (with the Single Large pattern and NO-INFO-
COMM condition being the omitted category) and 
interaction terms between these variables to control 
for the fact that the impact of the information and 
communication treatments can be different for the 
different periods in which the first best allocation in-
volves different spatial configurations. The standard 
errors are clustered at the session level to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across the sessions.  
Figure 2: Histogram of Number of Shared Borders between Winning Projects of Same Color 
Figure 3: Average POCER by Treatment and Spatial Configuration 
The positive and significant estimates for the VALUE and 
RANK Treatment dummy variables suggest that when the 
first best allocation constitutes a Single Large Reserve, auc-
tion performance is improved via higher cost-effectiveness 
when environmental benefit information (in either absolute 
or ranked format) is provided to subjects compared to when 
this information is suppressed. Moreover, the RANK condi-
tion performs better than the VALUE condition. Commu-
nication does not seem to have any impact on performance 
when no information or only VALUE information is pro-
vided although in the case of the RANK treatment, commu-
nication marginally reduces performance. 
Focusing on the Several Small condition, VALUE infor-
mation again improves efficiency over the NO-INFO condi-
tion although the effect is damped owing to the negative 
interaction effect between the information treatment and 
the Several Small dummy variable. Communication again 
has no impact on outcomes. Similar outcomes are obtained 
for the RANK treatment when no communication is per-
mitted and like in the case of the Single Large condition, 
performance is higher relative to the VALUE treatment as 
well. However performance is higher for the COMM-
RANK condition, an outcome different from that obtained 
for the Single Large Case.  
Next, there seems to be no impact of the information and 
communication treatment on outcomes when considering 
the Asymmetric spatial configuration. However, the positive 
estimate for the Asymmetric dummy variable suggests that 
performance is better for this condition relative to SingleL-
arge case. However, this effect is only marginally significant. 
Finally, the estimate for the Period variable is positive and 
significant suggesting that auction experience improves effi-
ciency. However, this result is to be interpreted with caution  
because there is some collinearity between the Period 
variable and the spatial configuration dummies since the 
configurations were assigned to periods in a sequential 
fashion leading to potential order effects.  
Conclusion:  
Our results show that providing ranked and absolute 
environmental benefit information improves auction 
performance relative to when no information is provid-
ed with ranked information having the greatest impact 
on efficiency. This is true regardless of the spatial config-
uration targeted. The impact of communication howev-
er seems to depend upon the information revelation and 
spatial configuration. In summary, by providing ranked 
information, the auctioneer can place checks on rent 
seeking while still facilitating the bidding exercise. In-
formation provision can also promote auction transpar-
ency goals fostering producers' trust in the government, 
which could be useful in encouraging their participation 
in the auction. Subsequent analysis will explore the 
sources of these treatment differences through an exam-
ination of individual behavior and analysis of bidders’ 
communications as well as delve deeper into factors im-
pacting item selection.  
Independent Variables  POCER 
Value Treatment  0.0290** (0.0131) 
Rank Treatment  0.0655*** (0.0201) 
Communication Treatment  0.0170 (0.0117) 
Period  0.00540*** (0.00105) 
Several Small  0.0780*** (0.0102) 
Asymmetric  0.0559* (0.0300) 
Communication X Value  0.00225 (0.0172) 
Communication X Rank  -0.0467* (0.0257) 
Rank X Several Small  -0.0605*** (0.0170) 
Value X Several Small  -0.0369*** (0.0138) 
Value X Asymmetric  -0.0110 (0.0315) 
Rank X Asymmetric  -0.0225 (0.0317) 
Communication X Asymmetric  0.0164 (0.0315) 
Communication X Several Small  -0.0142 (0.0117) 
Communication X Value X Several Small  0.0257 (0.0172) 
Communication X Rank X Several Small  0.0540** (0.0232) 
Communication X Value X Asymmetric  0.0163 (0.0364) 
Communication X Rank X Asymmetric  0.0218 (0.0353) 
Constant  0.776*** (0.0107) 
Observations  270 
Number of Sessions  30 
Table 2: Results of Random Effects Regression Analysis for Percentage of  
Optimal Cost Effectiveness Ratio 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, ** p<.0.05, p<0.1 
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